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NO. 2 JANUARY 2021 Introduction 
Future Combat Air System: 
Too Big to Fail 
Differing Perceptions and High Complexity Jeopardise Success of 
Strategic Armament Project 
Dominic Vogel 
The development of the Future Combat Air System (FCAS) is Europe’s most important 
defence project. Both technologically and militarily, the project has the potential to 
set new standards and revolutionise the use of air power. Politically, the multinational 
project is a litmus test for the extent to which Europe is capable of cooperating on 
security policy, developing its own capabilities and putting national interests to one 
side for this purpose. The success of the project rides to a great extent on Germany 
and France. However, the different perspectives and procedures of these two coun-
tries place FCAS at risk of collapse – a failure that would have serious disadvantages 
for all involved. 
 
The beginnings of the Future Combat Air 
System date back to 2001, when the first 
studies were carried out on the develop-
ment of new combat aircraft by a European 
alliance. The FCAS project is scheduled to 
be ready for deployment by 2040. The term 
Future Combat Air System or its acronym 
FCAS is often used in a misleading way. 
Although there are, of course, connections 
to the successor solution for the Tornado 
fleet, FCAS is much more than a combat 
aircraft project. 
The German government’s military avia-
tion strategy describes it as a “system of sys-
tems” that is to form the backbone of the 
air force in the long term. FCAS is in fact 
not a single flying platform, but rather an 
operational network composed of existing 
systems (e.g. Eurofighters or Tiger combat 
helicopters), but also new platforms such 
as the Eurodrone and a Next Generation 
Weapon System (NGWS). The NGWS is 
the innovative core of the FCAS project. It 
consists of a new fighter aircraft, the Next 
Generation Fighter (NGF), as well as remote 
carriers (RCs), all of which are connected 
to each other in a protected data exchange 
system called the Air Combat Cloud (ACC). 
FCAS and NGWS are not synonymous, 
but the latter is an integral part of the for-
mer. The overarching FCAS system can be 
imagined as an arrangement of concentric 
circles: In the centre is the NGF, the next 
generation combat aircraft. In the inner 
circle, together with the remote carriers, 
is the Next Generation Weapon System, 
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which is connected and controlled via the 
Air Combat Cloud. In the outer circle, the 
NGWS is linked with other systems. These 
include fighter aircraft, such as the Euro-
fighter or the French Rafale, but also 
tankers, naval vessels, satellites and assets 
of the other integrated armed forces. This 
is what makes up the Future Combat Air 
System, in which all elements must con-
stantly communicate with each other to 
form a cohesive system. 
The military value will therefore lie less 
in the individual platforms than in the way 
they are combined. If this architecture is 
transferred to the Bundeswehr’s existing 
systems, it means that the Eurofighter will 
be further developed and will continue to 
be operated within the FCAS framework, 
while the Tornado will be replaced by an-
other system that will also have to be inte-
grated into the FCAS. 
The conceptual complexity makes a fact-
based debate difficult. Some publications 
are dedicated to FCAS, but in essence only 
refer to the combat aircraft component. 
This results in a loss of definition and depth 
of detail. Reducing FCAS to the NGF com-
ponent underestimates the complexity and 
scope of the project and neglects relevant 
subcomponents such as the development 
of remote carriers, i.e. the development of 
a technology for armed drones that are at 
least semi-autonomous. 
The actual form FCAS takes may differ 
across the different partner nations, and the 
integrated platforms may vary. It is possible 
that in the future, individual states will 
only use the inner circle with the NGWS or 
only deploy the NGF or individual remote 
carriers in their armed forces. Despite all 
these options, it is important that FCAS is 
always understood as an overarching sys-
tem. The design of the project’s architectural 
framework takes this into account. FCAS is 
divided into a total of seven development 
fields (pillars), each of which is led by one 
company (see Figure 1). 
Development within these separate pil-
lars proceeds at different speeds and on the 
basis of separate contracts. The system fol-
lows an incremental approach. The explicit 
intention is not to wait until all compo-
nents have been fully developed, but rather 
to make interim results available in order 
to gather practical knowledge for the rest 
of the process. 
Germany and France are key players in 
the development fields, while Spain joined 
the organisation at a later stage. Opportuni-
ties for Spanish companies to participate 
arise firstly from gaps that are still emerg-
ing and need to be filled in a meaningful 
way and, secondly, from Spain’s industrial 
policy interests. Although it is emphasised 
that all seven pillars will make significant 
contributions to future developments, the 
most tangible and formative results are cer-
tainly to be expected in the areas of aircraft 
development, including the engine and 
drones (remote carriers). 
The perception of FCAS as a Franco-Ger-
man project has in fact become obsolete 
since Spain joined. In view of the division 
of development packages between Germany 
and France and the progress of the project, 
this view nevertheless remains valid. One 
of the central tasks for the further develop-
ment of the project is the full integration 
of Spain, which can also serve as a blue-
print for the later inclusion of other part-
ners. Here, it is important to allow Spain 
to participate in the progress of the project 
as quickly as possible to create a common 
starting point for the three sponsoring 
nations. 
Cultural and Structural Differ-
ences between Paris and Berlin 
Germany has previously favoured multi-
national European cooperation for the 
Tornado and Eurofighter. France, on the 
other hand, has opted for national devel-
opment approaches. Berlin and Paris are 
unequal partners, united in an ambitious, 
sometimes visionary armament project. 
However, their different political and stra-
tegic cultures also influence joint projects 
such as FCAS. France’s centralist presiden-
tial system contrasts with Germany’s strong 
parliamentary system, while France’s claim 
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to be capable of unilateral military action 
contrasts with Germany’s orientation 
towards multilateral structures. FCAS is 
therefore just as much a political project as 
a military one – misunderstandings and 
thus risks can always arise from the above-
mentioned differences, and these need to 
be addressed at the governmental level. In 
view of the complexity and the manifold 
implications of the project, the German 
participants need to be clear about their 
own, the French and the general European 
interests. 
In FCAS, the “best athlete” principle 
is applied: Each participating company is 
responsible for the area in which it has 
already proven capabilities. The individual 
nation heading/leading a specific pillar will 
be supported by a main partner. This divi-
sion mainly pertains to the upcoming 
demonstration phases of the project (phase 
1B and 2). 
A crucial question that arises at this 
point concerns the protection of emerging 
or existing intellectual property: to what 
extent should companies disclose their pro-
cesses and know-how, to what extent will 
technical specifications be made available 
to the other partners later? An agreement 
on how to deal with intellectual property 
rights (IPRs) is essential for the further 
progress of the project and impacts many 
other issues. For example, how the use of 
the individual components is organised will 
ultimately depend on this. Are maintenance 
and repair work only to be carried out by the 
lead manufacturer, or is access to the docu-
mentation guaranteed to such an extent 
that this can largely be done within the 
armed forces supported by national indus-
trial cooperation? If only the manufacturer 
can and is permitted to carry out certain 
parts of the maintenance, this might also 
affect operational readiness. 
Legal questions like this are also relevant 
for adaptations to and further developments 
of FCAS, such as the integration of new weap-
ons or avionics systems. Today, Germany 
and France use different, to some extent 
nationally developed armament systems for 
their aircraft. If certain parts of the tech-
nical documentation remain under lock and 
key, a bottleneck could also develop here. 
In addition to these rather practical im-
pacts of the aforementioned legal issues, 
industrial policy aspects also play a particu-
larly important role. German interests in 
terms of national key technologies (e.g. sen-
sor technology and electronic warfare) and 
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industrial strategic autonomy (e.g. the abil-
ity to develop a fighter aircraft completely 
independently) come up against each other. 
The goal of a European solution needs to be 
to minimise, ideally completely avoid, tech-
nological black boxes, as is often the case 
now with US imports. Before FCAS can pro-
ceed to Phase 1B and thus towards the de-
velopment of demonstrators, these issues 
must be resolved and contractually fixed 
in the individual project pillars. 
Berlin and Paris each pursue their own 
national (economic) interests in industrial 
policy. France’s defence sector, however, is 
structured fundamentally differently from 
its German counterpart. The French defence 
industry is closely interlinked with the state 
and resembles a cohesive entity. The state-
run Direction générale de l’armement (DGA) 
functions as the highest level of coordina-
tion for all defence projects and the central 
point of contact for all equipment issues. 
However, it is more than just a French pro-
curement office. For example, the DGA is 
responsible for a national pool of military 
engineers (corps des ingénieurs des études et tech-
niques de l’armement, IETA), who are specifi-
cally trained through assignments in the 
military, but also in industry placements. 
Thus, there is a much higher degree of per-
meability between the army and industry, as 
well as strong cultural and personnel links. 
The government has no qualms about being 
linked with the defence industry; on the 
contrary, the flow of information between 
government and industry is formalised and 
a natural part of national defence policy. 
The German side not only lacks an insti-
tutional counterpart to the DGA; German 
industry is also far less homogeneous. This 
imbalance both from an institutional per-
spective and in terms of the engineering 
culture leads to misunderstandings on both 
sides. Whereas in France the DGA, as the 
point of contact, centrally controls every-
thing, from signing the contract to issues 
around development and utilisation, in 
Germany various actors play a role, both 
internally and externally: the government, 
represented by the Ministry of Defence and 
Ministry for Economic Affairs, respectively; 
the Bundeswehr, through its procurement 
office (BAAINBw); and finally, industry, 
through individual companies or through 
its umbrella organisations, each with differ-
ent roles and interests. This structural dif-
ference generally favours France’s position 
and especially in the case of the fighter air-
craft, where it is the development leader. 
Ultimately, this also shows that the German 
procurement process needs to be reformed. 
The Different “Generations” of 
Fighter Aircraft 
The French-led Next Generation Fighter, 
the core of FCAS, is also described as a sixth-
generation fighter. It would thus formally 
be at the forefront of technical development. 
The US F-22 and F-35 models, for example, 
form the so-called fifth generation, which 
are currently the most modern fighters. 
Fighter aircraft have long been divided 
into generations by experts. This system 
makes it possible to distinguish fighter air-
craft models without having to deal with 
the exact technical specifications each time. 
The categorisation is essentially based 
on the characteristics of the technical stage 
of development and the period of develop-
ment. The division into generations is there-
fore rather sketchy and becomes blurred at 
the transitions between two levels. Further-
more, the generations in question are not 
uniformly defined, generally recognised 
standards. There are even several approaches 
to the division of generations, some of which 
differ greatly from one another. In 1990, 
for example, the historian Richard Hallion 
already identified six generations, whereby 
the then common, now obsolete designs 
such as the Tornado, Mirage 2000 or F-14 
represented the sixth and most modern 
generation. 
These days, more common systems use 
a different methodology, which is focused 
more on technology than era. The model 
published by the American Air Force Maga-
zine in 2009 is particularly widely used (see 
Figure 2). It identifies five existing genera-
tions based on technological milestones. 
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This system presents the prospect of a sixth 
generation as the next step in development, 
to which it attributes features such as op-
tional manning. The Tornado and the Euro-
fighter are classified as Generation 4 (Tor-
nado) or 4+ (Eurofighter), which is also the 
consensus in the German discourse on 
the issue. The French Rafale (4+) and Mirage 
2000 (4) are on the same spectrum. The 
assignment of an aircraft type to a certain 
generation can therefore be quite contro-
versial and is ultimately always an aspect 
of the marketing efforts of the manufactur-
ing companies. 
For each generation, several criteria have 
been defined that must be fulfilled for classi-
fication. What is unclear, however, is wheth-
er these criteria can be weighed against 
each other. For example, does better radar 
capability compensate for a lack of speed? 
If the term “generation” is used, it must 
be complemented by further classification 
and explanation rather than being used as 
a standalone designation. The label “Next 
Generation”, as used in the components 
of FCAS, refers to the system described (see 
Figure 2), but also allows other interpreta-
tions. If the claim that the NGF is to be a 
sixth-generation fighter is accepted, the 
F-35 is considered the technological bench-
mark. This also implies that one generation 
needs to be skipped if we are to get from 
the Eurofighter to the sixth-generation NGF 
without an intermediate step. This is un-
likely to be possible, above all, because 
characteristic features of both the fifth and 
the sixth generation, such as stealth tech-
nology, have not yet been manufactured by 
any of the companies involved and are con-
sidered very ambitious technologies. 
On the other hand, the term “next gen-
eration” can also refer to the aircraft that 
exist today. This would relativise the NGF 
somewhat, because it would then “only” be 
classified as being more modern than the 
Eurofighter and Rafale and would no longer 
have to explicitly form the sixth generation. 
From a German point of view, it is reason-
able for the development of the NGF to con-
sider the technological status of the Euro-
fighter as a basis. In this case, further devel-
opment in the direction of the NGF should 
primarily take place in those areas that the 
Eurofighter does not currently cover, i.e. pri-
marily electronic combat as a key national 
technology. 
The Nuclear Dimension of a 
Future Combat Air System 
Questions of technology sovereignty and 
the generational allocation of the NGF also 
play a decisive role when it comes to the 
nuclear capability of FCAS. France regards 




SWP Comment 2 
January 2021 
6 
stone of its own and European sovereignty 
and has earmarked 37 billion euros for it in 
its military budget until 2025. With around 
300 warheads, France’s nuclear potential is 
the fourth largest in the world. In addition 
to ballistic missile-equipped submarines, 
France has nuclear cruise missiles that are 
carried by the Rafale fighter aircraft, partly 
from aircraft carriers. From a French perspec-
tive, the NGF, as the successor to the Rafale, 
must be capable of performing this task. Two 
capability requirements result from this: 
firstly, the carrying of the nuclear stand-off 
weapon ASMP, and secondly, the capability 
to operate from aircraft carriers. 
For Germany, the link between FCAS and 
the nuclear role is more indirect. Today, the 
Bundeswehr participates in NATO’s nuclear 
sharing with its Tornado fleet. In addition, 
nuclear gravity bombs are stationed in Ger-
many. The future of this role is politically 
controversial. Among other things, critics 
are calling for an end to nuclear sharing, 
since it does not guarantee any influence 
on US nuclear strategy and the use of 
nuclear weapons is ethically unacceptable 
under international law. This debate crys-
tallised around the question of the suc-
cessor to the Tornado. 
From the federal government’s point of 
view, the continuation of nuclear sharing 
is a fundamental capability requirement in 
the choice of combat aircraft. The opposi-
tion, on the other hand, tabled a motion in 
the German Bundestag to end operational 
nuclear sharing and no longer certify a com-
bat aircraft for this purpose. In April 2020, 
the Federal Ministry of Defence (BMVg) pro-
posed a solution whereby it would like to 
replace the Tornados in the German Air 
Force with American F-18 models (Genera-
tion 4+). It refers to this as a “bridging solu-
tion” because the aim is to ensure opera-
tional readiness in the period between the 
imminent phase-out of the Tornado and the 
NGF, which will presumably not be avail-
able until 2040. However, there is no con-
crete indication of how the nuclear role 
will be taken into account in the future. 
If the “bridging” logic is followed, the 
American F-18 would be the next nuclear 
weapon carrier in this scenario. However, 
this aircraft does not have the necessary 
nuclear certification from the USA. Later, 
the NGF would have to take over the 
nuclear role, for which it would also need 
certification. This circumstance appears 
particularly problematic from today’s per-
spective: Firstly, a technical solution would 
have to be found to meet the requirement 
that this aircraft would have to be able to 
carry both the American and the French 
weapon. There is currently no aircraft 
capable of doing this. It would make the 
project even more complex because not 
only technical (gravity weapon vs. cruise 
missile) but also confidentiality aspects 
would have to be clarified. 
Secondly, the question of whether the 
Eurofighter could be certified as a nuclear 
carrier has already shown that this issue 
will be associated with major hurdles. For 
this certification, the technical documenta-
tion of the fighter and all other equipment 
involved in the mission must be disclosed 
on a regular basis. Since all user states must 
give their consent, the matter is very sen-
sitive for reasons of military and industrial 
secrecy. Since the NGF will officially be the 
French nuclear weapon carrier, it is part of 
France’s strategic autonomy. The necessary 
French approval for certification therefore 
seems uncertain from today’s perspective – 
after all, this is also a question of intellectu-
al property rights, an issue which is a com-
mon thread running throughout the project. 
If Germany sticks with the F-18 bridging 
solution, it might have a new nuclear car-
rier, but would face the challenge of inte-
grating this aircraft into the overarching 
FCAS system. An implicit weakening of the 
alliance and additional costs for fleet man-
agement would be the result. In the worst 
case, it could even become apparent that 
the NGF would not be considered a replace-
ment in the nuclear role. Since Germany 
might not have a successor for the F-18s, it 
would be forced to use a Generation 4+ sys-
tem for decades. 
Even today, doubts are being raised 
about the operational suitability of airborne 
nuclear sharing and the older the carrier 
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aircraft, the more justified these qualms in 
fact are. It is therefore not unlikely that the 
bridging solution will either become perma-
nent or that nuclear sharing in its current 
form will be put into question nolens volens. 
Germany and France tackle this dimension 
from different positions on deterrence and 
sovereignty, which is reflected in the debate 
on development at all levels. FCAS is un-
deniably a nuclear project as well. Paris ar-
ticulates this clearly; Berlin must not ignore 
this reality, but instead should also assert 
their rights to shape it in this context. The 
future of nuclear sharing should be explicitly 
addressed in the next legislative period. If 
the German government simply allows FCAS 
to continue in this direction, it will limit its 
own scope for action, which may have con-
sequences for Germany’s role in NATO. 
Outlook and Recommendations 
The different strategic cultures of Germany 
and France are evident in many areas. FCAS 
is another context which makes the partners 
aware of their differences but at the same 
time also of their mutual dependence. From 
the French perspective, the project is both 
an expression of European sovereignty and 
an essential component of national security 
and industrial interests. In Germany, this 
strategic significance is lost in a thicket of 
responsibilities within the procurement pro-
cess. For the further course of the project, it is 
important to change the way it is perceived. 
A stronger commitment on the part of the 
Federal Chancellery can help to achieve 
this. 
FCAS is not just another expensive arma-
ment project, it is so much more than that. 
It aims to develop and cultivate technologi-
cal excellence within Europe that is capable 
of having an impact far beyond the military 
sector. Applications such as secure Euro-
pean cloud services or unmanned autono-
mous flight control are technology drivers 
whose potential is just as relevant for civil-
ian use. Development and data sovereignty 
are closely linked to the call for European 
products to be used as a matter of priority. 
This is one of the reasons why it is so im-
portant to view FCAS as a holistic system. 
The project schedule is very ambitious 
given the complexity of the project and 
the many unknowns. The first flight of the 
NGF planned for 2035 and the start of the 
roll-out in 2040 will only be possible if all 
measures run smoothly without delay, 
which is unlikely from today’s perspective. 
The most pressing issue is the regulation 
of IPRs. 
We have to accept the fact that there will 
of course be some delays. Additional post-
ponements due to political ambiguities, 
lack of financial security and procedural 
inconsistencies must, however, be avoided. 
The German side is certainly lagging further 
behind. A necessary vehicle for improve-
ment is a fundamental reform of the pro-
curement process. 
Making the project a political priority 
is both expedient and feasible in the short 
term. In light of the political explosiveness 
and military significance of the project, a 
future German government should name 
FCAS as a priority and European lighthouse 
project in the coalition agreement. 
Within the framework of a Defence Plan-
ning Act as part of a reform of the arma-
ment process, the next project phases could 
be defined and financed on a multi-annual 
basis. On the one hand, this would send a 
strong signal to Paris, and, on the other, it 
would provide planning security for the 
German armed forces and industry. 
In addition, the European perspective of 
the project must be expanded. This also in-
cludes considering the project, particularly 
the NGF component, as an export commod-
ity and ensuring corresponding regulations. 
The task of future federal governments will 
be firstly to fully integrate Spain and then 
to find other partners in the medium term, 
but as customers rather than developers. 
The later developers enter the project, the 
more complex their participation will be, 
because construction sites that have already 
been closed would have to be reopened. 
The NGWS part of the project, in particular, 
is further advanced than other comparable 
projects in Europe, such as the British Tem-
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pest; further integration efforts should not 
endanger this lead. 
France, Spain and Germany currently do 
not have a fifth-generation fighter aircraft, 
unlike the UK or Italy, for example. For all 
three FCAS countries, the NGF is an essen-
tial part of the future plans of their air 
forces. Technologically, however, the idea 
of moving straight from the fourth genera-
tion to the sixth and setting the benchmark 
is extremely challenging. Overly optimistic 
expectations should be tempered, irrespec-
tive of justified ambition. The objective 
must be to develop a platform that repre-
sents a significant advance on both the 
Eurofighter and the Rafale and, moreover, 
is capable of competing with the F-35 in the 
market. Defining a Generation 5+ such that 
the jet becomes the European standard, 
would be better than coming up with an 
expensive solution that emulates the “real” 
sixth generation but cannot be fully used 
by any state. 
As far as the timetable is concerned, 
the issue may arise as to whether more 
emphasis should be placed on completing 
the NGF portion. France’s interest in this is 
likely to be very high, if only in view of its 
lead role in this segment and the lack of 
alternatives in the area of combat aircraft. 
Although the overarching idea must be to 
see FCAS as a comprehensive system, priori-
tising the most tangible part of the project 
may be the most sensible move under cer-
tain circumstances. 
If this project is not successfully completed 
within a European framework, future major 
joint armament projects in Europe will 
become increasingly unlikely. Efforts to 
consolidate European armament coopera-
tion would be thwarted, and dependencies 
on US manufacturers would continue to 
grow. The partners must remain acutely 
aware of this pan-European responsibility. 
Dominic Vogel is a Visiting Fellow with the International Security Research Division at SWP. 
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